Observations on Cluster Strike
Patterns in Laos
Cluster strike footprints are being surveyed and subsequently cleared in Laos. Little information is available
regarding the nature of cluster munition strike patterns. If more evidence from different types of strike footprints is collected, analyzed and distributed, operators will be better prepared for future survey and clearance tasks.

by Roly Evans [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

I

n early 2014, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Laos conducted an
analysis of U.S. bombing data from the Theater History of Operations Reports (THOR) database alongside confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) that were identified through a Cluster Munition Remnant
Survey (CMRS) and subsequently cleared. This analysis underlined the
need to accurately and routinely record all cluster strike evidence during
survey and clearance as detailed in IMAS 07.11 Land Release.1
Although nonmilitary clearance of cluster strikes has been conducted since the early 1990s, surprisingly little information is available
concerning the nature of cluster strike footprints. NPA, Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI) and Colin King Associates conducted a detailed
study in 2007 that analyzed a number of separate M85 Dual Purpose

Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) strike patterns in Lebanon
alongside trials conducted in Norway.2 FFI has also published a study. 3
However, little research has been done since.
Some operators accurately record cluster strikes during the survey
and clearance process. Unfortunately, evidence recording is not standardized, and what is recorded is not widely circulated. More remains
to be learnt from recording and analyzing differing cluster strike footprints. What sort of footprint patterns do different cluster munitions
make on the ground? What range of footprint surface areas are observed
for differing types of cluster munitions? What range of failure rates are
observed for differing types of cluster munitions? At what depths do we
typically find different submunitions in different soil conditions? How
do differing submunitions degrade over varying weather conditions and
periods of time? If more evidence from strike footprints was collected,
collated and distributed, operators would be better prepared for future
survey and clearance.
Cluster Munition Strike Footprints

Regardless of the delivery means, cluster munitions often form recognizable spread patterns on the ground. These are often referred to
as footprints or strike footprints. Whether by means of aerial cluster
bomb, artillery projectile, rocket or mortar, cluster strikes were believed
to form similar footprint patterns. However, anecdotal evidence from
Israeli and U.S. pilots suggests this may not necessarily be the case.
Oval pattern. In clearance circles, many believed that cluster munitions created a rough oval pattern of one form or another. It was thought
that any carrier munition that separates from its means of delivery and
functions above the ground will usually result in some sort of oval shape
or ellipsoid dispersion of submunitions. This is most apparent in ribbon armed, DPICM strike patterns. The height at which cluster munitions open, along with the linear momentum of the carrier munition,
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Figures 1 (left) and 2 (right). Examples of oval pattern cluster strikes.
All figures courtesy of NPA.
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Isreali Air Force (IAF) 107 Squadron Cluster Bomb Units 58 strikes Al Mazzeh near Damascus (Syria)
clearly showing the Donut effect, 11 October 1973. Three individual strikes are clearly visible and a
further one is discernible just above the two on the left.
All photos courtesy of http://www.fresh.co.il.

Overlapping CBU 58 strikes Dimasqh, Syria, 16 October
1973.

Two CBU 58s, probably set to open at above
2000 feet, suppressing 57mm anti-aircraft
fire during an attack by F4 Phantoms of 107
Squadron IAF on Al Mazzeh near Damascus,
11 October 1973.

Overlapping CBU 58s dropped near the Suez Canal, 19 October 1973.

affects the dispersion of the submunitions. The dispersion pattern elongates along the trajectory of the carrier munition. Although not the
most recent, the most numerous examples of this pattern were observed
in southern Lebanon. Spin-stabilized cluster munitions from Cluster
Bomb Units (CBU) were also widely believed to form a rough, oval footprint. Fin-stabilized cluster munitions, such as PTAB 2.5Ms or PM-1s,
might form a tighter, more circular pattern. The Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining cluster munition resource page illustrates how topography can have an additional, distinct effect.4

Observations tend to be anecdotal, since the recording of individual
cluster munitions—which is required to accurately map patterns—can
sometimes be impractical. This was the case during the initial emergencyclearance efforts in Lebanon in 2006. A number of operators attest that
an oval strike pattern of sorts was usually identifiable. If no pattern was
identifiable it was assumed that this was a mixture of patterns since targets were often subjected to multiple strikes, sometimes of differing
cluster munitions. As a very general rule, DPICM footprint lengths were
estimated at 1.5 times the width.
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Figure 3. Example of mixed footprints.
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Figure 4. Varying cluster-munition oval footprint sizes.

Donut pattern. During research in Laos, many former U.S. pilots
provided anecdotal accounts of using cluster munitions. Pilots overwhelmingly claimed that spin-stabilized submunitions, such as the
BLU-26, -36, -54, -61 and -63, tended to migrate away from the aiming
point after being released from the dispenser. This had the consistent
effect of creating a donut pattern on the ground, i.e., fewer submunitions would land in the center of any given cluster strike. This effect was
also widely noted by Israeli Air Force pilots using CBU-58s against targets in Syria and Egypt during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.
Moreover, all pilots confirmed that dive bombing was the most common
method of delivery because it maximized accuracy.
Mixed footprints. Cluster footprints frequently overlap when areas
are subjected to multiple strikes. In fact, most CHAs in Laos are from
overlapping footprints. Even when not repeatedly targeted, some areas
would still sustain multiple strikes since pilots sometimes dropped two
CBUs simultaneously, and these could overlap.
Overlapping footprints make donut patterns difficult to discern. The
effect resembles a messy Venn diagram. Nevertheless evidence from the
1973 Yom Kippur War suggests that patterns can be discerned in mixed
or multiple strikes.
Evidence of the donut pattern is rarely found on the ground during clearance today. Patterns are subject to change during intervening decades, as farmers and scrap-metal hunters move submunitions.
While a single footprint in the jungle might show this pattern, such
CHAs will likely be a low priority for technical survey and clearance.
However, in order to confirm the donut pattern, technical survey and
clearance teams will need to record accurately the position of each
bomblet found.
Oval footprint size. Oval cluster strike footprints vary in size according to the particular cluster munition used. NPA and FFI produced
the information in Table 1 (page 63) in 2007 as a rough guide to the comparative, average sizes of some cluster munitions’ footprints.
As an oval is roughly 80% of the rectangular parameters given for
the size of a footprint, the BLU-63 (CBU-58) footprint in the NPA and
FFI diagram is approximately 12,000 sq m.5 It is reasonable to assume
that CBU-24 footprints are roughly the same size as CBU-58 footprints.
The United States Air Force Armament Development and Test Center
believed CBU-24 footprints were slightly tighter.6,7 Other sources approximate an oval footprint size of 192,000 sq m.8 This is almost certainly an overestimate.
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Footprints in Laos

According to THOR’s U.S. bombing data, 81.45% of all submunitions
dropped on Laos were spin-stabilized submunitions such as the BLU-26,
-36, -54, -61 and -63. Moreover, 71.29% of all cluster munitions were either CBU-24 or CBU-29s, meaning submunitions such as the BLU-26
or the BLU-36. The Laos’ National Regulatory Authority’s Information
Management for Mine Action database (as of February 2014) suggests
that 78% of all found cluster munitions are spin-stabilized. If items reported as “bombies” are added to this figure, the total exceeds 79%,
which is remarkably close to the 81.45% suggested by U.S. bombing data.
So far, the average CHA size surveyed by NPA is about 4.4 ha. The
average number of CBU-24 and CBU-29 submunitions used per strike
was 5.01. This might point to an average footprint surface area of 8,782
sq m as a rough indicator. Notably, individual footprints often overlap.
Therefore if we divide an average CHA size by the average number of
dispensers used per strike we could possibly underestimate the individual average footprint size. As more CHAs are surveyed and subsequently cleared, a wider range of evidence will be available to assess footprint
sizes. Each CHA should be assessed to estimate whether it is a multiple
strike or a single footprint.
Failure Rates

If all submunitions are recorded when found, and the footprints
mapped, an informed assessment can be made of how many cluster dispensers were used from the patterns evident on the GIS map. By knowing the number of submunitions on the ground, and by estimating the
number of cluster munitions used, estimated failure rates can be determined. With this information, overall contamination within an area or
country can be estimated more accurately, especially if benchmarks exist such as U.S. bombing data or evolving survey information against
which the range of failure rates can be calculated. As more CHAs are
surveyed and cleared, the range of data and the probability of accurate
estimates will increase. Failure rates for spin-stabilized submunitions
are believed to still be classified. During testing of CBU-58, a 5% failure rate was expected. There is some evidence it could reach as high as
26%.9 The Congressional Research Service is only willing to place a very
broad implied failure rate when making estimates for Laos. “Estimates
of the number of unexploded submunitions from cluster bombs, range
from 8 million to 80 million.”10 Without access to complete test data for
common dispensers such as the CBU-24, identifying strike footprints in

Figure 5. Example of a completed task in Kongtayoun village, Thateng District.

areas without human interference through technical survey, subsequent
clearance and by counting the number of unexploded bomblets remains
the only means of estimating operational failure rates.
Laos Case Studies

Since 2011, NPA has surveyed over 2,000 CHAs in the Sekong,
Saravan and Attapeu provinces of Laos. Locations of all submunitions
were recorded when found. Some of these CHAs were subsequently
cleared, providing a clearer picture of ground contamination. Although
most CHAs are mixed strikes, deducing individual footprints with at
least some degree of assurance is reasonable. Several case studies in Laos
point to some interesting initial data.
In 2011, NPA conducted CMRS and clearance of a CHA near
Kongtayoun village in Thateng district, Sekong province. A CHA of
71,250 sq m was surveyed during CMRS; 29 items were found at this
stage. Almost all were BLU-26s. Another 316 BLU-26s were found during clearance. Figure 5 shows both cluster munitions found during
CMRS and clearance. The final polygon was 122,785 sq m. A 50 m fade
out was conducted.
The GIS image suggests four possible strike footprints or groups of
overlapping footprints in this CHA. The actual area of contamination
was significantly less than 122,785 sq m. The four suspected footprints—
ranging in size from 4,186 to 10,874 sq m—only cover 27,692 sq m,
22.6% of the final polygon. A CHA near Luckkao in the southeast of

Thateng district, Saravan province, shows strikes that have been subject to prolonged cultivation over decades.
The CHA from CMRS was 72,000 sq m, and a total of 19 BLU-26s
were found during this survey stage. Subsequent clearance of a 113,680
sq m polygon found another 180 BLU-26s. The area of the actual footprints totaled 53,786 sq m—47.3% of the cleared area. The CHA probably contained four strikes, perhaps more. Prolonged cultivation of the
area likely affected the spread of cluster munitions on the ground.
The patterns observed can also be seen at another CHA near
Kongtayoun village. CMRS and clearance were conducted in association with an agricultural development task in August 2011. The initial
CMRS found 84 BLU-26s. A large CHA of 159,891 sq m was drawn and
was three to four times the average CHA size (4.4 ha) of the areas found
by NPA in Laos. Clearance enlarged the polygon by 62.3% to 259,533
sq m when another 760 BLU-26s were found. The total cluster munitions for the final clearance polygon (including CMRS items found)
was 844 BLU-26s.
Table 1 (page 63) summarizes key information from the 10 footprints estimated in three separate CHA case studies. While representing a small data sample, the table indicates a range of values that will be
improved upon as more CHAs are surveyed through CMRS and subsequently cleared.
The small sample suggests CBU-24 and -29 strike footprints involve surface areas in a range of 2,224–29,480 sq m. Mixed strikes
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Figure 6. Confirmed Hazardous Area near Luckkao.

Figure 7. Confirmed Hazardous Area near Kongtayoun village.
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CHA Name

CHA
Surface
Area

CHA BLU 26
Density m2/
cm

Footprint
Surface
Area m2

BLU 26s
Found
During
CMRS

BLU 26s
Found
During
Clearance

Total BLU
26 Found

Implied
Failure Rate
%

Footprint
Density
m2/cm

Kongtayoun 1

4,186

2

48

50

7.52

83.72

Kongtayoun 1

10,874

20

44

64

9.62

169.91

6,317

6

137

143

21.5

44.17

6,316

7

50

57

8.57

110.81

11,105

20

185

205

30.83

54.17

4,544

9

98

107

16.09

42.47

Kongtayoun 2

4,255

20

107

127

19.1

33.5

Luckkao

2,224

1

11

12

1.8

185.33

29,480

8

101

109

16.39

270.46

22,082

9

83

92

13.83

240.02

10,138.3

10.2

86.4

96.6

14.53

123.46

Kongtayoun 1

122,785

391

Kongtayoun 1
Kongtayoun 2
Kongtayoun 2

Luckkao

259,533

113,680

591

534

Luckkao
Average

Table 1. Confirmed Hazardous Area case study footprint data.

possibly account for the larger footprints. The
estimated average is 10,138 sq m, although the
possible mixed strike footprints could be artificially inflating this number.
Inside the footprints, the bomblet densities range from 33.5 to 270 sq m per bomblet. The average failure rate of 14.53% is only
an indicator; similarly, these figures represent
only estimates. Some evidence suggests that
failure rates can be higher. The actual overall
bomblet density for the three CHAs in the table are one BLU-26 bomblet per 391 sq m for
Kongtayoun 1, one BLU-26 per 591 sq m for
Kongtayoun 2 and one BLU-26 per 534 sq m
for Luckkao, because clearance between footprints and the 50m fade out distance. Other
items such as BLU-3/Bs were found but were
not included in these figures.
Conclusion

This article touches upon a developing
field of study, reflecting a small portion of the
research conducted to date. Although limited, existing evidence points to some possible
trends. Further work remains to be done in order to understand footprints for the CBU-24
and CBU-29 as well as all other submunitions.
In Laos, footprints that are surveyed and subsequently cleared, specifically in areas of low
human impact (i.e., uncultivated, remote jungle areas), are likely to give the clearest view.
In order to improve understanding of
cluster strike footprints, all cluster munitions
found during survey and clearance should be

accurately recorded as per IMAS 07.11—some
operators already do this. However too much
evidence goes unrecorded and is therefore
lost. Through informed estimates of the number of cluster munitions used on a given footprint, implied failure rates can be calculated.
Other details, such as the depth at which differing submunitions are found, should also be
recorded. Better contamination estimates for
a given area or country can then be calculated
and recalculated as more evidence is gathered.
Hopefully, strike patterns or footprints for
a number of different cluster munitions can be
shared more in the years ahead. If a detailed
database of various cluster strikes found worldwide was available, operators could better prepare for survey and clearance tasks. Improving
the collective understanding of cluster munition footprints would surely benefit the sector
as a whole.
See endnotes page 67
(This article is derived from a longer research paper detailing observed patterns for a
range of cluster munitions found in Laos.11 The
author wishes to thank Mohammed Qasim for
his assistance in analyzing data during the research for this paper).
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